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The labor market plays an important role in economic development through its impact on the 
acquisition and deployment of skills. This paper argues that countries in the MENA region 
failed to deploy human capital efficiently despite high levels of education because of a large 
public  sector  which  has  distorted  incentives  and  because  of  excessive  regulation  in  the 
private  sector.  The  education  system  is  geared  to  the  needs  of  the  public  sector  so  the 
acquired skills are inappropriate for growth-enhancing activities. Excessive regulation of the 
private sector further removes the incentives for employers to recruit and train good workers. 
As a result, MENA countries found it difficult to adapt to new conditions in the 1990s and 
their rate of productivity growth fell to very low levels. The group as a whole failed to keep 
up with countries that used to be at a comparable level of development, such as East and 
South-East Asia. 
 










  Human  capital  –  the  skills  that  workers  posses  and  their  ability  to  perform 
complicated tasks – plays a key role in economic growth and development. The decisions to 
invest in skills, the types of skills that are chosen and their deployment into productive use 
are taken in labor markets. How successful a country is in accumulating useful skills and 
increasing its productive potential depends on the institutions that govern relations in the 
labor market: the structure of the labor market is critical in the acquisition of skills and by 
extension in the growth performance of nations. Our main message in this paper is that labor 
market institutions in the Middle East and North Africa have given distorted incentives for 
the acquisition of productive skills, and as a consequence the economies of the region are 
characterized by misallocation and a low social rate of return to skills. This poor record is 
reflected in the poor overall economic performance of the region.  
  After she sharp fall in oil prices in the 1980s, both national output and total factor 
productivity declined and remained low in the majority of MENA countries. Even though the 
region experienced a small recovery in the 1990s, it was not enough to allow MENA to close 
the gap with the more advanced developing countries, with which the region was catching up 
in the 1960s (East and South Asia in particular). The MENA countries have been falling 
behind, despite a rapid growth in the acquisition of skills through general education. Human 
capital in the region has been less successful in contributing to growth than elsewhere. The 
failure to reap the benefits of education can be largely attributed to the structure of labor 
markets in the region.  
  An important source of misallocation of skills can be traced to the large public sectors 
in the region and the incentives they give to highly trained labor to apply for jobs. Public 
sector productivity is low, despite highly trained employees, because of overstaffing. The 
high wages  and other job advantages (such as  job security, worker protection and social 
allowances) offered by the pubic sector have diverted skilled labor from growth-enhancing 
activities into unproductive public sector jobs. Public sector wages relative to private in the 
region  are  higher  than  elsewhere.  Although  this  difference  partly  reflects  the  higher 
educational qualifications of the public-sector labor force, it is not a sufficient explanation: it 
also indicates the presence of distortions, which are at the root of the misallocation of skilled 
labor.  
  Another  source  of  misallocation  of  skilled  labor  is  due  to  the  unemployment  of 
highly-qualified people, which is generally high in the MENA region. Many individuals in 
the middle to the upper end of the educational distribution are unemployed, yet at the same 
time  entrepreneurs  regularly  cite  the  lack  of  labor  with  suitable  skills  as  an  important 
constraint to hiring. The combination of high skilled unemployment and skill shortages is 
evidence of an educational system that trains individuals in unsuitable skills. In the MENA 
region this is almost certainly due to the fact that the educational system has been geared to 
the needs of the public sector.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
Other distortions that lead to lower rates of return to human capital can be traced to 
the  institutional  framework  that  regulates  the  employment  relationship.  Included  in  this 
framework are work standards, the hiring and firing employees, minimum wages and trade 
union recognition and powers. In MENA, labor market regulations have historically been 
stringent and not friendly towards employers. They are tight compared with other regions of 
the developing world, although not as high as in the formerly planned economies, or in some 
Latin American countries. The majority of the countries in the MENA region have suffered 
from this situation, which has led to rigidities in the labor market. Rigidities of this kind slow 
down the economy’s response to new economic conditions, such as changes in international 
trade relations, changes in oil prices and, going back a few years, to the Gulf war. There is 
evidence that in the MENA region adjustment to these events has been, and still is, slower 
than elsewhere.  
  The free market usually signals the need for skills through the relative wage system, 
namely, through the private rate of return to education and training. In MENA, the rates of 
return to schooling by sector of activity confirm the attractiveness of the public sector. The 
bias toward the public sector explains the low skill composition of the private sector and the 
skill mismatches in the region. There is evidence that the distortions in relative wages have 
increased the private rate of return to skill, without a corresponding increase in its social rate 
of return. So although highly-skilled workers who get public sector jobs are rewarded for 
their educational investment, labor productivity in the private sector does not rise to match 
the private rewards. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
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Introduction: The growth context 
The labor market is given a key role in the literature on economic growth. This may not 
appear at first to be the case, as many models do not refer explicitly to the structure of labor 
markets. But on deeper examination of the most popular recent models it is invariably found 
to be the case. A variety of “engines of growth” are usually discussed in the growth literature, 
which are directly or indirectly related to human capital and the implementation of new ideas. 
The  engine  of  growth  in  the  baseline  Solow  model  is  unspecified  labor-augmenting 
technology; what can labor-augmenting technology be if it is unrelated to human capital? In 
other models it is the ability to introduce new products, namely the knowledge how to do new 
things. And in others it is explicitly “human capital” without going into the specifics of what 
human capital does to output growth and how. The conclusion reached from a reading of the 
recent growth literature is that if we are to understand growth and development, we need to 
understand the creation and deployment of human capital. 
Human capital is created and put into use in labor markets. The structure of the labor 
market is therefore critical for the quantity and quality of human capital that is created and for 
the uses to which it is put. The structure of the market will determine, for example, how much 
human capital is put into growth-enhancing activities and how much into other activities, 
such as redistribution. It will also determine what types of human capital will be required in 
different environments. Yet, despite the wide appeal of the recent growth literature and the 
large number of economists that have been attracted to it, not many labor economists have 
switched from their traditional preoccupations to the study of growth. Research in growth has 
become the domain of macroeconomists whose data on labor markets amounts to two or three 
aggregate series – usually for employment, schooling, and participation rates. As a result, 
progress in the integration of labor market institutions with aggregate growth has been slow. 
In fact, it has not progressed much beyond the insights that generated the initial interest in 
growth theory. Looking at what data macroeconomists have on labor markets, and what 
propositions have been put forward by growth theorists for the link between labor-market 
outcomes and growth, it becomes obvious that not much progress can be made within the 
current cross-country research agenda.
3 Deeper country research is needed that pays attention 
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to the institutional structure of the country in question and to the links between human 
capital, the institutional structure and the growth outcomes. 
In light of this, research on growth and the labor market in the MENA region has to 
begin with an examination of the labor market institutions in the MENA countries that are 
likely to influence growth outcomes. Unfortunately past literature provides little guidance in 
this respect. There is virtually no literature explaining which labor market institutions are 
likely to be good for growth and which bad. Of course, economists have views on the matter, 
but there is no consensus founded on solid empirical research. For example, the thorough and 
comprehensive in coverage books on growth by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Aghion 
and Howitt (1998) do not mention a single labor market institution that might influence 
growth. But in many variants of their models they do devote space to what they consider the 
key to growth, human capital. The same can be said for the recent survey on labor markets 
and economic growth by Robert Topel (1999). The survey is devoted to human capital and 
growth but not to labor market institutions. Of course, this reflects the current state of the 
literature, not an omission of the authors of those works.
4 In the case of the MENA region, 
although some recent studies analyze quite extensively the functioning of the labor market, 
there is very little discussion on the connections between the labor market and growth.
5 
Country research on growth can make a real contribution to our understanding of 
growth if it can produce new data that can identify labor-market institutions that are 
conducive to the creation and deployment of good quality human capital and institutions that 
are wasteful of human resources. The purpose of this “thematic” paper is to point out the 
links between human capital and growth that need empirical verification and discuss some 
summary data for the MENA region that might help point directions for research on 
individual countries. The role that human capital occupies in growth theory and its likely 
empirical contribution in the MENA region is first discussed. It is shown that despite rapid 
growth in human capital resources it is unlikely that human capital has contributed 
significantly to growth in this region. The challenge facing research in this region is to find 
the reasons for the apparent wasteful use of human capital. We examine the sectoral 
composition of employment and the institutional structure that governs wage determination 
and employment and make some suggestions about the role of each and the directions for 
future research. 
Human capital and economic growth 
Human capital definitions 
Human capital is created by formal education and formal training as well as by informal 
learning mechanisms. Each time someone develops the ability to do something new, he or she 
increases his or her human capital. Of course, measuring human capital in its full dimension 
is an impossible task. For this reason, the literature usually confines itself to measuring the 
years of schooling in the working population and using the outcome as a proxy for all human 
capital in the country. 
  As a first step in the study of labor markets and growth we therefore need a series for 
the stock of human capital (years of schooling) in the labor force or the population of 
working age. This can be done by employing an inventory method to enrolment data, 
provided one or more points of reference are available for the stock from labor force surveys. 
                                                 
4 More recently there has been increased emphasis on the role of institutions in growth and their empirical 
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The stock is augmented by the years of schooling of school leavers and depreciates by the 
education of those leaving the labor force. Data for the stock of human capital for the 
population of working age is also useful in making inferences about the likely changes in the 
supply of labor. A country with large amounts of human capital outside the labor force (e.g. 
with many educated women who are not participating) is more likely to experience changes 
in its participation rates than another. 
  Data for five-year periods in 1960-99 are available (Barro and Lee, 2000) and these 
data could provide a starting point for the research on the connection between human capital 
and growth in MENA. Table 1 reproduces some summary statistics for a selection of MENA 
countries, as well as by region. The main feature of these statistics is the steady growth of 
education in all the MENA countries of our sample throughout the period. In the 1960s, 
MENA educational attainment was one of the lowest in the world with an average of 1.6 
years of schooling for each adult over the age of 15 years. This low attainment was 
comparable to the low attainment in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. By 
1999, however, the MENA region had closed the educational gap with the more advanced 
developing economies. With an average of 5.8 years of schooling, MENA is far ahead South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and less than one year behind Latin America and East Asia. 
 
Table 1. Average number of schooling years, total population over 15 years old 
                     
Country  1960  1980  1999    Region  1960  1980  1999 
Algeria  1.0  2.7  5.4    Sub Saharan Africa  1.7  2.5  3.5 
Bahrain  1.0  3.6  6.1    East Asia  3.4  5.3  6.7 
Egypt    2.3  5.5    Eastern Europe  4.5  6.3  7.2 
Iran  0.8  2.8  5.3    Developed Economies  6.7  8.3  9.5 
Iraq  0.3  2.7  4.0    Latin America  3.5  5.1  6.2 
Jordan  2.3  4.3  6.9    MENA  1.6  3.7  5.8 
Kuwait  2.6  4.3  7.1    South Asia  1.5  2.9  4.2 
Syria  1.4  3.6  5.8   
Tunisia  0.6  2.9  5.0    Source: Authors' calculation from Barro and Lee (2000) 
Source: Barro and Lee (2000)         
Growth theory 
What specific role does growth theory give to human capital? Modern growth theory appears 
to give, at one and the same time, a large role to human capital but not say enough about it. In 
some models, such as the Lucas (1998) model, human capital drives growth. Everything else 
– capital, output – adjusts endogenously to the accumulation of human capital. In other 
models, such as the imitation model of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1990), it drives the imitation 
technology which ultimately determines the speed of convergence to the technological 
frontier. This model is of particular relevance to developing countries, especially those in 
proximity to more advanced trading partners. The MENA countries fall into this category in 
relation to the European Union. In R&D models, such as the variant estimated by Benhabib 
and Spiegel (1994), human capital is the factor that is engaged in R&D and so its productivity 
determines the rate of growth. This model, however, is less relevant to MENA, as R&D 
activity is concentrated in a small number of advanced countries. 
  But whereas human capital is postulated to be the factor that plays these roles, it has 
not yet been possible to empirically test any model with sufficiently detailed data to arrive at 
a smaller set of possible links between human capital and growth. The macroeconomic 
models that have been estimated, mostly with cross-country data, or with panel regressions CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
making use usually of the Barro-Lee data set for human capital, cannot discriminate between 
these models.
6 
It can be argued that -- as a first step in our attempts to understand the connection 
between labor market structure and growth -- research should concentrate on the relation 
between labor market structure and the contribution of human capital to GDP growth, without 
trying to discriminate between the different roles that have been attributed to human capital in 
the literature. Of course, if the research could discriminate between some roles it would be an 
added bonus. But the more urgent need (and the one that will be of more policy relevance) is 
to identify institutional structures that are good for the productive use of human capital and 
for encouraging more investments in it and structures that are poor in this respect. 




Human capital in some models influences the technological parameter A, through for 
example R&D or imitation of more advanced countries’ technologies. And sometimes it 
augments the labor input L as a productive factor. In the first class of models it influences, at 
least temporarily, the rate of growth of A, and hence of output. But in the second class of 
models it influences the level of output with the same coefficient as the labor input. 
Cross-country regressions have come under criticism for a variety of reasons but 
whatever their merits, they cannot distinguish between these two variants of the model – does 
the level of human capital influence the rate of growth of output or its level? In fact, hardly 
any robust results have been derived from these regressions about the contribution of human 
capital to growth, though when human capital does not show up as a significant influence in 
cross-country regressions most authors blame the data. Such is the conviction that human 
capital must be an important influence on growth. We will argue below that it is possible for 
human capital to have a high private rate of return but not contribute to growth, when the 
institutional structure of the labor market is such that “rent seeking” or other less productive 
activities yield a higher private return to the individual than do growth-enhancing activities. 
In some cases, the contribution of human capital to growth can be hampered by its low 
quality, or by its unsuitable nature, as when skill mismatches and market rigidities lead to the 
unemployment of qualified people.  
The fact that the stock of human capital has been trending up in most countries of the 
world but the rate of growth of output has not, gives an indication that if the level of human 
capital influences the rate of growth of output over certain periods of time, it is likely to be a 
temporary phenomenon. But if this were to lead to adoption of the other extreme view, that 
the human capital stock influences output with the same coefficient as labor, the role of 
human capital in production and the implied rate of return to human capital would be too 
small to be credible. The results of the cross-country empirical research are diverse but they 
are not consistent with the hypothesis that human capital enters the production function with 
the same coefficient as labor
7. 
The capital stock is usually treated as endogenous in growth models and driven by the 
savings rate in the economy. In the models which make human capital the engine of growth, 
the rate of growth of the capital stock eventually converges to the rate of growth of human 
capital. In addition, the capital-labor ratio is also influenced by the features of the human 
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capital production function. The prediction of growth models is that a country with more 
human capital will eventually have more physical capital as well. As a first step, however, it 
might be worthwhile to explain the contribution of human capital to output growth net of the 
contribution of the capital stock, namely to the series logY-αlogK, though ultimately a 
complete explanation of the contribution of human capital to growth will need to explain the 
dependence of investment on human capital. 
Growth accounting 
Growth accounting exercises decompose the growth of output into growth due to capital, 
employment and total factor productivity (TFP). Their information content is limited and the 
decompositions they arrive at should not be treated as research findings that should guide 
policy but as suggestive of further research. Yet occasionally growth accounting exercises 
come up with surprising (when viewed through the OECD lens, perhaps) facts and cause 
controversy, as Young’s (1995) work on growth accounting for South-East Asia did. For the 
MENA research on growth and labor, growth accounting exercises can shed light on the level 
and rate of growth of TFP in each country and their relation to human capital. More 
specifically, how can we account for the fact that the human capital stock has grown rapidly 
since 1960, yet output growth seems to have stagnated? 
Tables 2 and 3a show GDP growth rates for a selection of MENA countries and by 
region, gross and decomposed into growth in the capital stock, labor force and TFP. The 
share of capital in the TFP calculations is taken to be 0.4, although there are variations across 
countries and in deeper country research country-specific estimates could be given. The share 
of labor is correspondingly taken to be 0.6. In the absence of a time series for employment, 
we used a series for total labor force growth. TFP1 shows the results of the TFP calculations 
when the contribution of human capital is not netted out. The idea behind TFP1 is that human 
capital contributes to TFP growth; namely, that human capital is one of the factors that 
explains the path of TFP growth and not the level of output. TFP1 is calculated as the residual 
of the production function previously specified: log(TFP1) = log(Y) – 0.4 log(K) -0.6 log(L). 
In TFP2, however, we have treated human capital as a factor that improves the quality of the 
labor force and so we used data on human capital to augment the contribution of labor before 
deducting it from output growth. With a Cobb-Douglas production function this amounts to 
treating human capital as a factor of production. In this case, TFP2 is calculated as follows: 
log(TFP2) = log(Y) – 0.4 log(K) -0.6 log(L’) where L’ (the skilled labor) is the labor force 
(L) augmented by the number of years of schooling of the population over 15 years old (H), 
the rate of return to education being fixed at 0.1.
8  The results should be regarded as 
indicative of trends rather than accurate descriptions of reality, as data tend to be unreliable. 
There are more than one time series for GDP growth for these countries and they are not all 
consistent with each other, and the capital stock data sometimes exhibit implausible behavior. 
                                                 
8 Following Dasgupta et al (2002), the exact way in which we augmented the labor input is L’=L*exp(0.1*H) 
where H is the number of years of schooling. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
 
Table 2: TFP calculations for a selection of MENA countries 
(average annual growth rates in %) 











Algeria  1970s  5.7  8.7  3.2  0.3  4.4  -0.4 
Algeria  1980s  2.5  4.9  3.8  -1.8  5.5  -2.8 
Algeria  1990s  1.5  1.0  3.8  -1.1  5.0  -1.8 
               
Egypt  1970s  8.0  9.8  2.1  2.8  4.5  1.4 
Egypt  1980s  4.9  8.8  2.5  -0.1  4.5  -1.3 
Egypt  1990s  4.3  3.4  2.9  1.2  4.2  0.5 
               
Iran  1970s  0.7  12.8  3.0  -6.2  4.3  -7.0 
Iran  1980s  3.8  2.6  3.0  1.0  4.2  0.3 
Iran  1990s  4.0  1.3  2.3  2.1  3.7  1.2 
               
Jordan  1970s  8.7  10.8  2.3  3.0  3.4  2.4 
Jordan  1980s  3.2  7.0  4.9  -2.6  6.7  -3.6 
Jordan  1990s  5.2  1.3  5.8  1.2  6.9  0.6 
               
Morocco  1970s  5.6  8.8  3.2  3.0  4.1  -0.4 
Morocco  1980s  3.6  4.9  2.6  -2.6  3.4  -0.4 
Morocco  1990s  2.2  3.5  2.5  1.2  3.4  -1.2 
               
Tunisia  1970s  7.4  7.0  3.6  2.4  5.1  1.5 
Tunisia  1980s  3.7  4.6  2.7  0.3  3.7  -0.4 
Tunisia  1990s  4.8  3.3  2.9  1.7  4.0  1.0 
Source: Authors' calculations from World Bank data 
 
Tables 2 and 3a show that GDP growth experienced a sharp decrease in the 1980s, 
after the fall in oil prices. This has been the case in all the MENA countries in the sample 
(except Iran, Table 2) and in all regions (except South Asia, Table 3a). Both investment and 
employment decreased during the period, especially the former. But these declines do not 
fully account for the decrease in GDP growth, so our calculations show a sharp fall in TFP 
growth which becomes negative in the majority of our MENA sample. In this regard, the 
MENA region did not perform better than Africa, although in terms of GDP and human 
capital growth the region as a whole outperformed Africa. 
In the 1990s, the MENA region experienced a small recovery of GDP and TFP 
growth, despite a further cut of investment projects (in the public sector in particular). The 
recovery, however, was not sufficient to allow MENA to close the gap with the more 
advanced developing countries, with which the MENA region was catching up in the 1960s 
(East and South Asia in particular, Table 3a). 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
Table 3a. TFP Calculations by Region 
(average annual growth rates in %) 











Africa  1970s  3.7  5.5  2.5  0.0  3.1  -0.3 
Africa  1980s  2.2  3.1  2.7  -0.7  3.4  -1.1 
Africa  1990s  2.7  2.0  2.6  0.3  3.2  0.0 
               
East Asia  1970s  7.7  10.6  3.1  1.6  4.1  1.1 
East Asia  1980s  6.1  8.5  2.7  1.1  3.4  0.7 
East Asia  1990s  6.2  8.5  2.2  1.4  3.0  0.9 
               
Eastern Europe  1970s  5.7  8.2  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.6 
Eastern Europe  1980s  4.4  4.7  2.5  1.0  1.3  1.7 
Eastern Europe  1990s  3.8  4.1  2.6  0.7  2.0  1.0 
               
OECD  1970s  4.2  5.2  1.5  1.2  2.4  0.7 
OECD  1980s  2.8  3.3  1.1  0.8  1.9  0.3 
OECD  1990s  2.8  3.1  1.0  0.9  1.7  0.6 
               
Latin America  1970s  4.7  6.4  2.9  0.4  3.6  0.0 
Latin America  1980s  1.0  3.1  2.8  -1.9  3.5  -2.3 
Latin America  1990s  3.2  3.3  2.7  0.3  3.2  0.0 
               
MENA  1970s  6.1  9.6  2.8  0.6  5.0  -0.7 
MENA  1980s  3.8  6.1  3.3  -0.6  5.4  -1.9 
MENA  1990s  3.7  2.3  3.3  0.8  4.3  0.2 
               
South Asia  1970s  3.6  4.5  2.5  0.3  2.4  0.3 
South Asia  1980s  5.3  5.5  2.3  1.7  3.2  1.2 
South Asia  1990s  5.0  4.5  2.5  1.6  3.1  1.3 
Source: Authors' calculations from World Bank data.       
 
The independent TFP estimates of Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994) show a low TFP 
growth in all countries in the period 1960-90 and, more strikingly, a negative overall TFP 
growth rate for the MENA region as a whole (see Table 3b). TFP growth in the MENA 
region compares poorly even with the rest of Africa. Our calculations are consistent with the 
Nehru and Dhareshwar estimates but show that the negative results are even more striking 
when the contribution of human capital to TFP is deducted (TFP2 series, Table 3b). Because 
human capital accumulation was higher in the MENA region than in the rest of Africa, its 
performance net of human capital was even worse than in the earlier estimates that ignored it. 
This suggests a low contribution of human capital to growth in the region when compared 
with the rest of the world. 
The task faced by a researcher of economic growth in the MENA region is to explain 
why TFP growth in the region was so low, in view of the fact that other things equal, the low 
initial income should have returned TFP growth rates above the average of the world 
economy. The relatively high investments in human capital that took place in these countries 
since the 1960s should also have contributed to faster convergence dynamics, namely, faster 
TFP growth during the sample period. For research on labor markets and growth in particular, 
the task is to identify features of the labor markets of the MENA countries that contributed to 
the low return on human capital and the low overall TFP growth. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
Table. 3b. TFP calculations by regions 
(annual percentage changes) 
Nehru and  







Region  ECM  FD    Africa  0.0  -0.3 
Africa  -0.8  -0.4    East Asia  1.3  0.8 
East Asia  0.5  1.2    Eastern Europe  1.5  1.6 
OECD  0.5  1.3    OECD  1.3  0.8 
Latin America 
-0.6  -0.1    Latin America  0.1  -0.3 
MENA   -1.2  -0.3    MENA  0.5  -0.4 
South Asia  0.3  0.8    South Asia  1.1  0.7 
Notes: Unweighted averages of annual country rates. ECM stands for “error-correction method” and FD for 
“first-difference method”. Both sets of calculations ignore human capital.  
Labor market structure 
Human capital in the MENA region grew steadily throughout the period of low TFP growth 
(see Table 1). Therefore -- even in the absence of a careful statistical analysis and despite the 
other factors that played a role in slowing down TFP growth, such as economic reforms, 
macroeconomic and political instability, or governance -- it is obvious that human capital will 
not be able to contribute much to growth in country regressions. This may be due to the fact 
that human capital in MENA has suffered either from low quality or from a misallocation that 
diverted it from employment in growth-enhancing activities. A lot of it must have stood idle, 
engaged in “rent-seeking” or less productive activities (not properly recorded in national 
income statistics, such as the running of social services). An analysis of this issue, with a 
view to finding ways to improve the situation if misallocations are found, requires an 
examination of the labor market’s static efficiency. 
Static efficiency 
Static efficiency investigates the allocation of labor across sectors of the economy. The 
concern in the present context is whether the allocation of skilled labor is the one most likely 
to maximize the country’s growth potential. Table 4a shows the allocation of labor across 
some broadly defined sectors. Manufacturing occupies a smaller fraction of the labor force 
than in other industrializing countries, and this is compensated for in the MENA region by a 
bigger public sector (Table 4b). Tables 5a and 5b show that MENA’s government and public 
sector (excluding health and education in the case of Table 5b) employ a bigger fraction of 
the non-agricultural labor force than in any region outside Africa.  
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Table 4a. Sectoral distribution of employment   Table 4b. Public sector employment 
(% of total employment)        (% of total employment) 




  Country  (1)  (2) 
Algeria (1995)  12  30  58    Algeria (1990-1999)  58  30 
Bahrain (1994)  1  54  43    Bahrain (1991-2001)  68  80 
Egypt (2000)  30  21  49    Egypt (1988-1998)  27  38 
Iran (1996)  23  31  45    Iran (1986)  31   
Iraq (1990)  16  18  66    Jordan (1987-1996)  45  36 
Jordan (1993)  6  25  69    Kuwait (1989-2000)  42  75 
Kuwait (1988)  1  24  74    Morocco (1991-1999)  12  8 
Morocco (1999)  44  21  33    Oman (1991-1999)  76  79 
Syria (1991)  28  25  46    Quatar  (1986)  37   
Tunisia (2001)  22  34  44    Saudi Arabia (1992-1999)  70  82 
WB & G (2000)  14  34  52    UAE (late 1980s)  31   
UAE (2000)  8  33  59    Tunisia (2001)  24  21 
          Yemen (late 1980s)  16   
Source: World Bank (2004)      Source: Shaban et al. (2001) and World Bank (2004) 
Note: (1) and (2) relate respectively to the first and the 
second year in the country list above 
 
Table 5a. The size of government in the 1990s 
Region  employment 
(% total) 
wages     
(% GDP) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  6.2  6.3 
Asia  6  4.5 
Eastern Europe  16  3.9 
OECD  17.5  4 
Latin America  9  5 
MENA  17.6  9.8 
Source : Schiavo et al. (2003)   
 
 
Table 5b. Share of public sector in non-agricultural employment and human capital 
Region  Share of 
public sector 
Estimated loss GDP  
growth, 1985-95 
Sub-Saharan Africa  32.9  8.8 
Asia  19.8  4.9 
OECD  20.6  5.1 
Latin America  17.7  4.3 
MENA  31.7  8.4 
 
Another set of more detailed statistics shows that in Egypt (Table 6), government 
employs more than half of all degree holders in the country, with public enterprises also 
employing a large fraction. Public sector employment of this magnitude clearly interferes 
with the static efficiency of the labor market and deeper country studies need to investigate 
carefully the uses to which the public sector puts this human capital. 
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Table 6. Educational attainment by employment sector, Egypt, 1988 
Sector  Below intermediate 
Intermediate and 
above  University and above  Total 
All sectors  76.9  14.6  8.5  100 
         
Government  7.0  47.2  55.6  16.9 
Public enterprise  5.3  15.8  14.7  7.6 
Private agric.  57.6  9.6  2.6  45.9 
Private non-agric.  29.7  24.5  23.0  28.4 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Source: Shaban, et al.  (1993), Table 11. 
 
Recent studies show that low productivity is exacerbated in the public sector of 
countries in the MENA region by an increasing overstaffing (World Bank, 2004). In the early 
1990s, the share of underutilized workers in the public sector ranged from 17 % (Algeria) to 
21 % (Egypt) and to even more in the oil exporting countries. This share, despite its 
substantial size, has increased recently to 35 % in Egypt and 40 % in Jordan. Berthelemy et 
al. (1999) estimated the average loss of GDP growth due to public sector employment by 
making the admittedly strong assumption that the fraction of human capital employed in the 
administrative public sector does not contribute at all to growth. Their estimate is shown in 
the last column of Table 5b. The loss in the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa regions is bigger 
than elsewhere by a large margin. 
Another source of misallocation of skilled labor comes from unemployment of highly 
qualified people. Unemployment rates are generally high in the MENA region (Table 7a) but 
more importantly, the unemployment rates of people in the middle to the upper end of the 
educational distribution are even higher (Table 7b). The waste of human capital through the 
high unemployment rates must be a contributory factor to the low overall contribution of 
human capital to growth. Interestingly, despite the high unemployment rates, entrepreneurs in 
these countries regularly cite the lack of labor with suitable skills as an important constraint 
to hiring. The combination of high skilled unemployment and skill shortages at the industrial 
level provides support to those who have claimed that the education systems in the MENA 
region have mostly been geared to the needs of the public sector. The high wages and other 
job advantages (such as job security, worker protection and social allowances) offered by the 
pubic sector led to educated workers queuing for public sectors jobs, and so to the absence of 
pressure to reform the educational system according to the needs of industry. 
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Table 7a. Unemployment rates 
(% labor force) 
Country    
Algeria (2000)  29.8 
Bahrain (2001)  13 
Egypt (2000)  9 
Jordan (2000)  14 
Iran (2001)  13.8 
Kuwait (2003)  2.6 
Lebanon (1997)  8 
Morocco (2002)  22 
Oman (1996)  12 
Quatar (2002)  12 
Saudi Arabia (1999)  7.5 
Syria (2001)  11 
Tunisia (2001)  15.4 
UAE (1999)  2.5 
W-B & Gaza (2001)    25 
Yemen (1999)  11.5 
Source: World Bank (2004) 
 
How did MENA countries find themselves into a situation of large public sectors and 
misallocation of their human capital resources? Country experiences differ and a full analysis 
requires an examination of the institutional structure of the countries in question and the 
historical context. For the region as a whole, however, there has been one big missed 
opportunity. Historically, the biggest influence in these countries has been the oil boom of the 
1970s, which lasted up to about 1982, and which enriched the public sector and led to the 
large education expansion. But the resources gained during the oil boom were used to expand 
and protect the public sector from market competition and not spent in a way that was 
favorable to growth. They contributed to the large expansion of public sector employment, to 
the misallocation of resources in the public educational systems and to the introduction of 
other institutional rigidities that the economies could afford (perhaps) when the oil revenues 
were abundant, but not when they dried up.
9  
 
Table 7b. Unemployment rates (by educational level) 
Country  None  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  All 
Algeria (1995)  9.6  30.9  30.9  68.4  27.9 
Egypt (1998)  4.1  5.7  22.4  9.7  11.4 
Jordan (1991)  8.2  8.7  25.8  21.5  14.4 
Morocco (1999)  9.4  26.3  32.4  37.6  15.6 
Oman (1996)  5.6  13.4  24.8  2.8  10.8 
Tunisia (1997)  10.2  20.8  15.4  6.4  15.7 
Source: Shaban et al. (2001) and World Bank (2004) 
                                                 
9 See Pissarides (1993) for more discussion of the historical context and the relation between oil revenues and 
public sector expansion. More recent discussion about the role of reforms can be found in Dasgupta et al (2002) 
and more discussion about the role of social contracts, political regimes, and wars and their influence on the 
economy of the countries in the MENA region can be found in World Bank (2004). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
Institutional Foundations 
Labor market institutions influence the allocation of resources. In the present context the 
question is whether human capital is employed in growth-enhancing activities or elsewhere. 
There is a risk, when writing about labor market institutions to drift too far from the growth 
context. The focus of our discussion here is on the institutions that are likely to influence the 
allocations of labor in growth versus non-growth enhancing activities, even if other 
institutions appear more important at first sight. Two broad institutional structures appear 
most relevant for the allocation of resources and growth in the MENA region. 
First, wage setting institutions and their implications for relative wages across 
sectors. Do high public sector wages explain why the public sector is so large in the MENA 
region? Table 8 shows that public sector wages relative to private in the MENA region are 
higher than anywhere else (in addition, the public sector offers more non-wage benefits). 
Although this difference may partly reflect the higher educational background of the labor 
force working in the public sector, it also indicates the presence of distortions. If it reflected 
only the higher educational attainment of workers in the public sector there would have been 
no queues to enter the public sector and no higher unemployment of more educated workers. 
As it is, the public sector is obviously not competing with industry for qualified labor – it 
rather sets the agenda for wages and rations employment. The high wages and high non-wage 
benefits that we already mentioned constitute an important incentive for qualified workers to 
enter the public sector, with the poor results for the contribution of human capital to overall 
growth that we have already noted. 
In addition to the waste of human capital in less productive public sector employment, 
the large size of public employment in these countries inflates the public sector wage bill. 
The wage bill has to be met from the public budget and the debt and tax implications for 
private sector activity impose another large burden on the economy that works against 
growth. 
 
Table 8. Central Government wages, early 1990s 
Region  Central government wage bill, 
( % of GDP) 
Ratio of public sector to private 
sector wages 
Sub-Saharan Africa  6.7  1.0 
Asia  4.7  0.8 
ECA  3.7  0.7 
Latin America  4.9  0.9 
OECD  4.5  0.9 
MENA  9.8  1.3 
Overall  5.4  0.8 
Notes: Table 3 of  MNSED (1999). 
 
Second, the institutional framework for hiring and firing employees and more 
generally the framework that regulates the employment relationship, including the legal 
framework for standards at work, minimum wages and trade union recognition and powers. 
This institutional framework is likely to be the result of government policy but workers’ 
organizations may have their own rules on hiring and firing. In the MENA region, labor 
market regulations have historically been stringent and are still too tight compared with other 
regions of the developing world, although not as high as the formerly planned economies or 
Latin America (Table 9a). The majority of the countries in the region are affected by this 
situation, which has introduced rigidities in the labor market (Table 9b). At the micro level 
rigidities of this kind lead to low productivity and removal of the incentive to innovate and 
start new businesses. At the macro level these negative consequences translate to slow 
growth, and to inertia in response to macroeconomic shocks, unemployment and CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
misallocation of labor. More in-depth analysis is required of the implications of the regulation 
of employment and business for growth than can be pursued here, and the recent availability 
of the World Bank database provides a basis on which country papers can build. 
 
Table 9a: Labor market regulation in developing regions 
Region  Composite index 
Sub-Saharan Africa   1.45 
East Asia   1.6 
Europe and Central Asia  1.95 
Latin America  2.05 
MENA  1.65 
South Asia   1.25 
Source: Doing Business Database (2003) 
 
Table 9b: labor market regulation in MENA countries 
Country  Composite index 
Algeria   1.5 
Egypt   1.85 
Jordan   1.55 
Iran   1.9 
Lebanon   1.2 
Morocco   1.35 
Syria   1.3 
Tunisia   1.7 
Source: Doing Business Database (2003) 
Market flexibility 
It is clear from results obtained so far on TFP growth in the MENA countries (and elsewhere) 
that the way that we define and measure TFP gives a cyclical TFP series with downswings 
that can last for many years. This is a reflection of the well-known fact that labor productivity 
is pro-cyclical. But unlike OECD economies, which are diversified and suffer from regular 
cyclical shocks of small intensity, developing countries have suffered mostly from more 
pronounced shocks associated with well-defined one-off events, such as the debt crisis in 
Latin America, the fall of oil prices in MENA and the financial crisis in South-East Asia. The 
intensity and persistence of the resulting downswings in TFP growth are directly related to 
the ability of the economy to adjust to new long-term conditions with the minimum of waste. 
This is where the issue of market flexibility becomes key to growth. Consistent with this view 
it has been shown that, where labor markets are more rigid, countries tend to experience 
deeper recessions before adjustment, as well as slower recoveries (Forteza and Rama, 2001).  
The main economic shocks in the MENA region over the last twenty years that seem to 
have affected TFP growth are the fall in the price of oil after 1982 and the Gulf War a decade 
later. Both these events reduced GDP growth for many years. The speed of response of the 
economy to the after-shock situation was generally slow, a fact that is at least partly due to 
the rigid institutional structure of the labor market. As with static efficiency, the institutional 
features that are likely to influence the dynamic adjustment are likely to be the wage setting 
institutions and how flexible they are in allowing wages to respond to changes in market 
conditions; the hiring and firing restrictions that govern the speed of labor turnover; and the 
ease with which workers can migrate and change sector of employment. Of course, the 
economy sooner or later adjusts to a new steady state. The question in the present context is 
how fast it adjusts and whether policy can help it adjust faster and with less waste. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
In the MENA region the adjustment to the oil shocks seems to have been slower than the 
adjustment to crises in other regions; for example, both Latin American and South East Asian 
countries came out of their respective debt and financial crises faster than did MENA 
countries out of their oil crisis. Although there has been some downward adjustment of real 
wages in the 1990s, the dominant role of government as employer has slowed down the 
adjustment. It requires a lot more research at the country level, however, to determine 
whether the labor market structure was responsible for the slow adjustment. In particular 
whether one or more of the three institutional features of the preceding paragraph – wage 
setting, employment flexibility and migration – played a role in slowing down the adjustment 
to the oil shocks. No general claims can be made for the region as a whole since the 
institutional structure is not well documented at the regional level. 
The acquisition of skills 
The discussion so far focused on the allocation of human capital between alternative uses, 
some of which are growth-enhancing and some less so. But equally important is the question 
of the acquisition of skills, and how effective are labor markets in generating a large amount 
of skills that are useful for growth. This requires first a discussion of the educational and 
training system and how it is organized in each country. It includes the coverage and quality 
of the education system, who pays for education and what incentives there are for individuals 
to engage in training. Has human capital grown in some countries because the state financed 
it and encouraged particular skills or because private initiative did it? And what can be said 
about the quality of the human capital stock? 
  The free market usually signals the need for skills through the relative wage system, 
namely, through the private rate of return to education and training. Are labor markets in the 
MENA region effective in this signaling function? Do individuals respond to the signals? The 
answers to these questions touch on the dynamic efficiency of the labor market. Under 
dynamic efficiency the emphasis is shifted to the efficiency of the labor market in the 
provision of adequate resources for education and training and to the recruitment of enough 
people for these purposes. 
In MENA, these questions need special attention because of the distortionary labor 
market institutions that we have highlighted. The outcome appears to be low quality 
education
10 and skill mismatches due to the bias toward public sector needs. The distortions 
in relative wages that we have highlighted increase the private rate of return to skill without a 
corresponding increase in its social rate of return, and its implications for dynamic efficiency 
are an issue that needs further investigation at the country level. Statistics on rates of return to 
schooling by sector of activity -- available for different countries -- confirm the attractiveness 
of the public sector. This is true at all levels of education, with the exception recently of 
Jordan and Yemen (Table 10).
11  
                                                 
10 See for example United Nations human development reports (2002, 2003). 
11 It has not been possible to find easily accessible data sources for the quality of the human capital stock for the 
region as a whole. Psacharopoulos (1985) contains virtually no MENA countries in his sample. Data on quality 
on a country basis are reported in the updated paper by Barro and Lee (2000), but the regional coverage for 
MENA is not satisfactory CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.35 
 
 
Table 10 Rate of return to schooling 
(% per year) 
  Egypt  Egypt  Morocco  Morocco  Jordan  Yemen 
   1988  1998  1991  1999  1997  1997 
Primary             
Male public  8.2  6.4  12.4  6.1  3.5  2.7 
Male private  2.3  3.6  3  3.4  2  2.7 
Female public  1.9  5.3  28.2  10.5  -3.9  5.1 
Female private  0.9  7.2  8.5  9.4  14.7  8 
Lower Secondary             
Male public  7  4.9  10.7  8.2  2.9  2.7 
Male private  2.5  4.4  6.4  6.3  5.5  2.7 
Female public  7.7  8.2  22.3  13.4  5.2  3.7 
Female private  3.2  -11.2  13.9  10  9.8  7.4 
Upper Secondary, General             
Male public  8.6  8.8  10.6  8.8  2.8  2.2 
Male private  6.3  7.3  10.4  7.7  6  2.2 
Female public  8.6  9.7  18.1  12.1  4.6  3.9 
Female private  3.8  -1.5  16.4  11  10.4  12.1 
Upper Secondary, 
Vocational             
Male public  9.6  7.2  8.4  6.8  3.8  3.3 
Male private  5.3  5  6.9  5.8  3.2  3.3 
Female public  7.9  9.6  16.5  11.9  4.3  4.3 
Female private  4.4  4.9  11.1  11.3  8.6  10.7 
University             
Male public  10.1  8.8  10.8  8.9  4.6  3.8 
Male private  8.5  7.3  12.5  9.5  10.2  5.2 
Female public  8.9  10.7  15  12.8  6.8  4.4 
Female private  9.1  10.9  15.2  9.3  12.9  6.8 
Source: Assaad (2002) and World Bank (2004)         
Conclusions 
Human capital occupies a central role in modern thinking about growth. Despite a large 
literature on the matter, however, there is a lot to be learned: there is no consensus on its role 
in growth and development, probably because this role varies across different institutional 
settings and national environments. The labor market is the place where human capital is 
created and deployed. This paper has argued that the study of the links between labor markets 
and growth should concentrate on a study of labor market influences on the quantity, quality 
and productivity of human capital. This requires an investigation at the level of individual 
countries of the institutions that influence the acquisition and employment of human capital 
and their effectiveness in enhancing growth. 
  Our investigation of broad trends in the MENA region has revealed that there has 
been fast growth in the acquisition of skills through general education. But following the oil 
crises of the 1980s, the countries in the region have been unable to utilize their human 
resources to overcome the negative consequences of the crises for output and growth. In this 
respect, human capital in the MENA region has been less successful in contributing to growth 
than elsewhere, e.g., in East or South Asia. We argued that large and inflexible public sectors, 
wage inflexibility and excessive labor market regulation may be some reasons behind this 
failure. This opens up a number of issues about reform which require more and deeper 
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